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While there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence on the economic impacts of adverse health 
shocks, there is relatively little hard empirical evidence.  This paper builds on recent empirical 
work to explore in the context of post-reform Vietnam two related issues: how far household 
income and medical care spending respond to health shocks; and how far household 
consumption is protected against health shocks.  The results suggest that adverse health shocks—
captured by negative changes in body mass index (BMI)—are associated with reductions in 
earned income.  This appears to be only partly—if at all—due to a reverse feedback from income 
changes to BMI changes.  By contrast, there is a hint—the relevant coefficient is not 
significant—that adverse BMI shocks may result in increases in unearned income.  This may 
reflect additional gifts, remittances, etc. from family and friends following the health shock.  
Medical spending is found to increase following an adverse health shock, but not among those 
with health insurance.  The impact for the uninsured is large, equal in absolute size to the income 
loss associated with a BMI shock.  The lack of impact for the insured points to complete 
insurance against the medical care costs associated with health shocks, and is consistent with the 
very generous coverage of Vietnam’s health insurance program at this time (1993-98).  The 
question arises: have Vietnamese households been able to hold their food and non-food 
consumption constant in the face of these income reductions and extra medical care outlays?  
The results suggest not.  For the sample as a whole, both food and non-food consumption are 
found to be responsive to health shocks, indicating an inability to smooth non-medical 
consumption in the face of health shocks.  Further analysis reveals some interesting differences 
across different groups within the sample.  Households with insurance come no closer to 
smoothing non-medical consumption than uninsured households.  Furthermore, and somewhat 
counterintuitively, better-off households—including insured households—fare worse than poorer 
households in smoothing their non-medical consumption in the face of health shocks, despite the 
fact that in the case of insured households there are no medical bills associated with an adverse 
health event.  Why the poor rely on dissaving and borrowing to such an extent, and do not 
apparently reduce their food and non-food consumption following an adverse health shock while 
the better off do, may be because the levels of food and non-food consumption of the poor are 
simply too low relative to basic needs to enable them to cut back in the face of an adverse BMI 
shock.   
Keywords: health shocks; consumption smoothing; insurance.  I.  INTRODUCTION 
Anecdotal evidence on the economic impacts of adverse health shocks abounds.  An 
Egyptian woman in a recent global participatory poverty study known as Voices of the Poor 
reported “We face a calamity when my husband gets ill.  Our life comes to a halt until he 
recovers and goes back to work.” (Narayan, Patel et al. 2000).  The same study recorded the case 
of a 26 year-old man in Lao Cai, Vietnam, who, as a result of the large health care costs 
necessitated by his daughter’s severe illness, moved from being the richest man in his 
community to being one of the poorest.  Also recorded were the remarks of a Vietnamese woman 
from Tra Vinh who said “Poor people cannot improve their health status because they live day 
by day, and if they get sick they are in trouble because they have to borrow money and pay 
interest.”   
While there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence, firm empirical evidence on the 
economic consequences of health shocks is harder to come by.  This paper builds on two recent 
papers (Dercon and Krishnan 2000; Gertler and Gruber 2002) to explore two related issues: how 
far household income and medical care spending responds to health shocks; and how far 
household consumption is protected against health shocks.   
The extent to which household income responds to health shocks depends on a number of 
factors.  One is the extent to which households rely on one or two members for their income.  
The income of an urban household with a single breadwinner may not be affected at all when 
household members other than the breadwinner falls sick, but is especially vulnerable when the 
breadwinner falls ill.  A rural household with many household members—including children—
contributing to the household’s income is less vulnerable when, say, the household head falls 
sick, and may even be able to reallocate labor time to compensate for lost income.  Both types of 
household may see any losses in earned income associated with illness offset at least in part by 
increases in unearned income.  This could involve payments to cover lost wages by a formal 
sickness insurance scheme.  Or it might involve informal payments by relatives or friends in the 
form of extra remittances or gifts intended to help cover lost income and medical expenses.  It is 
plausible that the size of any informal payments could depend on whether the household has 
access to other forms of assistance or insurance—a household that is already covered by formal 
sickness and health insurance schemes is unlikely to be considered especially needy by relatives 
and friends.  Evidence on the differential impacts across different household types of health 
shocks on earned and unearned income is scant—this paper presents new evidence on the 
subject.   
The degree to which medical care spending responds to health shocks is likely to depend 
largely on whether the household—or the affected member of the household—has formal health 
insurance, or is covered by a fee-waiver program.  But even households with health insurance 
may see medical outlays rise in response to health shocks.  An obvious reason is their coverage 
may be limited—they may not be covered for outpatient expenses or for drug costs, or there may 
be a ceiling on reimbursements.  Less obviously, providers and patients alike may increase 
utilization once the patient is covered (more diagnostic tests, more expensive medication, etc.), 
so that a patient’s outlays following a health shock may be little different with and without   1
insurance.  Evidence on this issue is also limited, especially on the question of whether the 
medical outlays of people with insurance are less responsive to health shocks.   
The impacts of health shocks on income and medical spending reveal nothing about the 
impacts of health shocks on household (non-medical) consumption.  It is, however, a widely held 
view that health shocks reduce incomes and raise medical spending to such an extent that 
household consumption is often considerably affected, and may force levels of food consumption 
of near-poor households below the amount required to maintain a target calorie intake.  There is 
very little hard evidence on the subject, however.  Yet this—and the issue of whether people 
experiencing health shocks receive appropriate medical care—is a key issue.  Policymakers 
presumably would not be particularly worried if, through one means or another, households are 
able to protect their consumption following a health shock, despite suffering an income loss and 
spending more on medical care.   
The obvious means by which consumption would be smoothed in the face of health-
related income shocks and medical spending shocks would be through saving and borrowing.  
The evidence to date suggests that households—especially poor ones—are not able to smooth or 
insure against income shocks completely
1, suggesting that income changes resulting from health 
shocks are likely to be passed through into consumption changes.  It may, however, be that 
income shocks stemming from health shocks may be easier or more difficult to insure against 
than other types of income shock.  Informal credit may be easier to obtain insofar as relatives and 
friends might look more favorably on a request for a loan following a health shock than they 
would after a shock of other some type, especially if they thought the household were to blame 
for the income change.  Formal credit, by contrast, may be harder to get, since there is no 
collateral involved, and since the effectiveness of medical care is subject to a high degree of 
uncertainty, health investments might be considered too risky by lending institutions.  It may 
therefore be dangerous to assess the ability of households to insure consumption against health 
shocks indirectly by coupling estimates of the responsiveness of income to health shocks with 
estimates of the responsiveness of consumption to income shocks.  This paper presents direct 
evidence on the impacts of health shocks on consumption, reporting separate results for food 
consumption and non-food consumption.   
II. SETTING, METHODS AND DATA  
The Setting 
The setting for the analysis is Vietnam during the period 1993-98.  Prior to the Doi Moi 
(or ‘renovation’) reforms of the late 1980s, health services in Vietnam were provided at the 
taxpayer’s expense, with patients paying only the cost of drugs (Bloom 1998).  With the 
decollectivization of agriculture and the liberalization of the economy, the role of government in 
health finance was reduced dramatically.  Since 1989 government facilities have been allowed to 
charge fees, and in 1991 legislation was passed that paved the way for a private health sector 
(Bloom 1998; Glewwe 2003).  Household out-of-pocket spending on health care has, as a result, 
risen dramatically, accounting for 80% of total health spending in 1998 (World_Bank, SIDA et 
                                                 
1  See, for example, Townsend (1994; Townsend 1995), Jalan and Ravallion (1999), Gertler and Gruber (2002) and Blundell et 
al. (2004).     2
al. 2001).  Tales of hardship caused by out-of-pocket health care payments abound, and survey 
data appear to be consistent with this.  In 1998, 7% of an average Vietnamese household’s total 
consumption was absorbed by health care spending (World_Bank, SIDA et al. 2001), and in the 
same year one-fifth of the population spent in excess of 20% of their non-food consumption on 
health care (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer 2003).  In 1998, a single visit to a public hospital by 
someone from the bottom quintile cost the equivalent of 22% of their annual  non-food 
consumption (World_Bank, SIDA et al. 2001).   
During the period in question, the government had three broad measures to reduce the 
cost of health care at the point of use.  First, in 1994 it assumed the responsibility of paying 
employees in commune health centers, which in the pre-reform system had been the 
responsibility of communes (Glewwe 2003).  Fees to commune health centers were as a result of 
this change supposed to be non-existent, and in practice the vast majority of people (82% 
according to one estimate) did not pay fees for commune health center visits in this period 
(World_Bank, SIDA et al. 2001).    Second, a patchwork system of fee exemptions was 
developed, oriented almost exclusively towards the cost of hospital care.  This was intended to 
be targeted towards the poor.  However, in practice the better off have benefited almost as much 
as the poor, though the targeting appears to have improved between 1993 and 1998 
(World_Bank, SIDA et al. 2001).  Third, the government introduced a health insurance scheme 
in 1993, known initially as Vietnam Health Insurance (VHI).  Civil servants, state enterprise 
workers, the military and Communist party officials are all covered at the government’s expense, 
and private firms with more than 10 employees were and still are required to enroll their 
workers.  A voluntary component of the program exists, but official records show that voluntary 
enrolment has remained very low to date, and that those enrolled voluntarily tend to be school 
children who are typically enrolled en masse by their school, with the children’s parents paying 
the cost of the contribution.  Coverage is much less generous for the voluntarily enrolled.   
Insurance coverage is concentrated fairly heavily among the better off.   
In addition—subject to the policies outlined in the previous paragraph—to making out-
of-pocket medical expenditures more sensitive to health shocks, the Doi Moi reforms are also 
likely to have raised the impact of health shocks on household income.  The reforms aimed 
explicitly at replacing the planned economy by a regulated market economy.  The 
decollectivization of agriculture made for a far closer link between a household’s income and its 
agricultural output.  In industry, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were either downsized or 
closed, with a third of SOE employees losing their job between 1989 and 1992 (Glewwe 2003).  
The private sector grew rapidly to fill the void, but the likely effect of these changes is that the 
link between a worker’s wages and his or her productivity-related characteristics will have 
increased.  It is known, in fact, that the returns to schooling in Vietnam’s formal wage sector 
doubled between 1993 and 1998 (Gallup 2003), and it seems likely that the Doi Moi reforms will 
have increased the returns to other dimensions of human capital, including health.   
Methods 
Our interest is in assessing the impacts of (logarithmic) changes in health, Δlnh, on 
logarithmic changes in income, ΔlnY, medical consumption, ΔlnM, and non-medical 
consumption, ΔlnC.  We use a fixed-effects specification similar to that used by Gertler and   3
Gruber (2002), where (logarithmic) changes in the variable of interest, ΔlnZ (Z alternately being 
Y, M and C), are regressed on Δlnh, community fixed effects, and a vector of household controls: 
(1)   ij ijk k k ij j ij X h Z ε γ β α + + Δ + = Δ ∑ ln ln . 
Here i indexes households, j their communities, and the α’s are the community fixed effects, 
defined in the empirical analysis at the commune level rather than at the village level.  Eqn (1) 
sweeps out time-invariant observable and unobservable variables that influence the levels of Z, 
but not unobservable influences on changes in it.  Insofar as these influences vary only across 
communities, they will be captured by the community fixed effects.  The household controls 
include average age in the household, its square and cube, and changes in household size (and 
the square and cube of these changes).   
The interest is in the size of the coefficient β.  A value of β equal to zero in the income 
equation would indicate that health shocks do not impact on income, while zero values of β in 
the medical and non-medical consumption equations respectively would indicate that people are 
fully insured against the medical costs associated with a health shock, and can fully smooth 
consumption in the face of health shocks or have otherwise been able to fully insure their non-
medical consumption against health shocks.   
In addition to eqn (1), a second equation is estimated allowing the α’s and β to vary with 
insurance status, I, and the household’s income.  Interacting Δlnh with I allows us to test the 
hypothesis that the insured are better protected from health shocks.  Income in the interactions is 
captured by a dummy, P, indicating whether the household was in the bottom 40% of the income 
distribution in the initial year, referred to below as a ‘poor’ household.
2  The second equation 
estimated is thus: 
(2)   ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijk k k ij j ij h P P h I I X h Z ε τ ϕ φ δ γ β α + Δ + + Δ + + + Δ + = Δ ∑ ln ln ln ln , 
where I and P are allowed to influence the rate of change of Z directly as well as through their 
interactions with Δlnh.   
As an alternative to eqns (2) and (3), a set of reduced-form equations have also been 
estimated, along the lines:  
(3)  
ij ijk k k j ij
ij ijk k k j ij
ij ijk k k j ij
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and smoothing is assessed through an examination of the correlations among the residuals.  This 
is broadly the approach used by Blundell et al. (2004) in their analysis of income shocks and 
consumption.  The first equation can be thought of as a stochastic version of a dynamic health 
                                                 
2 In fact, closer to 60% of the population was poor in Vietnam in 1992/93 (Glewwe 2003).     4
demand equation in Grossman’s (1972) model.  The evolution of health capital over time reflects 
the time profiles of the depreciation rate and any other time-varying variables, but also the size 
of any random ‘shocks’.  The latter, which are captured by ε1, could be rationalized in terms of 
the depreciation rate being stochastic rather than deterministic as in Grossman’s original 
formulation (cf. Grossman 2000).  Correlations between estimates of ε1 and the other residuals 
provides information on the extent to which health shocks get transmitted into unexpected 
changes in income, and medical and non-medical consumption.    
Data 
The data are from the two-wave Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS).  A 
representative sample of 4800 households was interviewed in 1992/93, and then again in 
1997/98.    
The focus is on changes in adult health, measured by the body mass index (BMI).  This is 
equal to the individual’s weight in kilograms divided by the square of the individual’s height in 
meters.  BMI is first and foremost a measure of nutrition.  A person with a BMI score below 18.5 
is considered ‘underweight’, while someone with a BMI score in the range 18.5-24.9 is 
considered ‘normal’.  An individual with a BMI score in the range 25-29.9 is considered to be 
‘overweight’, and someone with a score higher than 30 is considered obese.  In Vietnam in the 
survey period, less than 1% of the sample in either year was classified as overweight or obese, 
while roughly a quarter of the sample were classified as underweight.   While primarily a 
measure of nutritional status, BMI has been found to be a good predictor of mortality, with 
mortality risk higher at both the bottom and top ends of the scale (Calle, Thun et al. 1999).  
Account is taken below of the non-monotonic relationship between health and BMI.  Beyond 
BMI, the VLSS contains very little by way of useful information on adult health.  Respondents 
were asked whether they had been sick in the four weeks prior to the interview on both 
occasions, but the question was posed differently in the two waves, so comparisons across the 
waves are not possible.  In any case, evidence from the work of Gertler and Gruber (2002) 
suggests that changes in a short-term and self-reported health measure such as illness in the 
previous four weeks is unlikely to be associated with income and consumption changes.  Indeed, 
a key conclusion of their work is that any failure to smooth consumption in response to health 
shocks is likely to be in relation to objective long-term health measures, not short-term 
subjective measures.  Their measure—an index of people’s ability to perform activities of daily 
living—is not available in the VLSS.  BMI seems, however, a good substitute.  Indeed, it may be 
potentially a good complement.   
Income is total per capita household income, broken down into earned income (wage 
income as well as income from agriculture and any family business) and unearned income (gifts, 
remittances, pensions, and the like).  Medical spending is per capita household medical outlays, 
excluding health insurance contributions, based on a 12-month reference period.  Non-medical 
consumption is broken down into food consumption and non-food consumption, the latter 
including the use value of durables.
3   
                                                 
3  Full details are available in the VLSS basic information document available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/country/vn98/vn98bif.pdf.     5
A household is classified as ‘insured’ if any adult member is covered by the VHI scheme.  
Because almost all of the voluntary members are school children, this means that the insurance 
variable captures compulsory rather than voluntary insurance.  This is easily defended as 
exogenous
4 and avoids the difficulty of heterogeneous coverage across the compulsory and 
voluntary schemes.  By defining a household as covered if any adult member is insured does not 
capture the fact that some households have more than one member covered.  Alternative more 
precise definitions would, however, make the results harder to interpret.  The income-poverty 
variable, P, is defined as one if the household is in the poorest 40% of the 1992/93 total per 
capita income distribution.   
Table 1 provides some key descriptive statistics.  The BMI variable is the change in the 
logarithm of the BMI average across all adult household members—alternative definitions are 
discussed and used below.  On average, household average BMI has increased between 1993 and 
1998, but there is considerable variation, with many households (N=1779) experiencing 
reductions in average household BMI.  Income and consumption growth were strong in Vietnam 
over the period in question.  Medical consumption, by contrast, grew more modestly, and 
unsurprisingly food consumption grew more slowly than non-food consumption.  Variations 
across households—including negative growth—are evident in income, medical consumption 
and non-medical consumption.   








Δh: logarithmic change in BMI  4295  0.014  0.067  -0.350  0.424 
ΔY: logarithmic change in total income  4227  0.446 0.928  -5.863  6.171 
ΔY: logarithmic change in unearned 
income 3335  0.612  1.859  -7.337  8.017 
ΔY: logarithmic change in earned 
income  4077 0.369  1.044  -6.524  8.259 
ΔM: logarithmic change in medical 
consumption 4075  0.111  1.498  -5.259  5.976 
ΔC: logarithmic change in non-medical 
consumption 4302  0.211  0.451  -1.961  2.239 
ΔC: logarithmic change in food 
consumption 4302  0.061  0.455  -1.827  2.240 
ΔC: logarithmic change in non-food 
consumption 4292  0.250  0.671  -2.597  4.482 
I: household has at least one member 
with health insurance in 1998  4303 0.266  0.442  0.000  1.000 
                                                 
4  Due to the way school children are enrolled en masse, the term ‘voluntarily’ is actually a bit of a misnomer.     6
III. MAIN RESULTS  
BMI changes and  income changes  
The results in Table 2 show that household average changes in BMI are positively and 
significantly associated with changes in total per capita household income.   On the face of it, 
this is evidence of BMI shocks leading to reductions—and substantial reductions at that—in 
household income.  This association may, however, reflect reverse causality—idiosyncratic 
income shocks feeding back to BMI.  Several pieces of evidence together suggest, however, that 
this could only be a part of the explanation of the association.   
Table 2: Effects of changes in BMI on changes in income and medical spending 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 






Change in average BMI among household 



















































Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Equation also includes commune-level fixed effects, which were jointly 
significant.   
First, recent evidence suggests that income changes have had at best a small effect on 
child malnutrition in Vietnam in the period in question (Glewwe, Koch et al. 2003).  Most of the 
instrumental variables (IV) cross-section estimates of the impact of household consumption on 
child malnutrition reported by Glewwe et al. are statistically insignificant, and all of their panel-
data estimates are insignificant.  Their estimates are also small, all of which leads them to 
conclude that economic growth has been responsible for only a small part of the rapid 
improvement in child nutrition in Vietnam during the 1990s.  These results refer, of course, to 
child nutrition, not adult BMI.  However, the case for believing that OLS regressions of 
malnutrition on household income or consumption suffer from simultaneity bias is typically 
considered to be even stronger in the case of adult BMI than child malnutrition (Alderman 
2000)—it is not a question of household members adjusting their labor supply to care for sick 
children or being able to buy more medical care for them; rather the link is more direct, with 
adults themselves falling sick and having to reduce hours or working less productively.  This 
refers to the size of any bias, of course, and it is possible that even after correcting for it, the 
impact of income on adult nutrition in Vietnam in this period has been appreciable even if its   7
impact on child nutrition does not appear to have been.  It is not obvious, though, why this 
should be the case.   
Second, the reverse causality interpretation of the association between changes in BMI 
and changes in total income is hard to square with columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.  These show that 
while changes in earned income are positively associated with BMI changes, changes in 
unearned income are negatively  associated with them.  Economic theory (Grossman 1972) 
predicts that changes in earned and unearned income will alter the demand for health, but that 
while changes in earned income (or, more exactly, the wage rate) may cause a reduction in the 
demand for health, the effect of a rise in unearned income ought to be unambiguously non-
negative.
5  The signs are therefore contrary to what theory predicts if it is indeed income changes 
that are driving health changes.  A more plausible explanation of the negative coefficient in 
column 2 is that as BMI falls, the household receives additional gifts, remittances, etc. from 
concerned friends and relatives—an issue explored further below.   
Table 3 presents the third piece of evidence in favor of the argument that it is primarily 
BMI changes leading to income changes rather than vice versa.  Instead of including a variable 
capturing household average BMI change, Table 2 includes separate variables for the BMI 
change of the household head and for the BMI change of the spouse.  The correlation between 
these two variables is just 0.091.  The results in Table 2 show that the association between 
household average BMI changes and household income reflects entirely the association between 
changes in the BMI of the head of household and household income.  This is consistent with 
BMI changes bringing about income changes if, as is likely, the household head plays a more 
important role in generating income than the spouse.   
Table 3: Differential effects of BMI changes of household head and spouse 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Change in total 
income 
Change in unearned 
income 
Change in earned 
income 














Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include all covariates listed in Table 2 and commune fixed 
effects, which were jointly significant.  
One might object to the results in Tables 2 and 3 on the grounds that BMI is not, as was 
previously noted, monotonically increasing in good health. Table 4 shows the effects of 
transforming BMI into a monotonically-decreasing measure of health, using the mortality risks 
for the BMI ranges reported in Calle et al. (1999).  The results are very similar, reflecting the 
very small numbers of overweight and obese Vietnamese in the 1990s.  In what follows, BMI is 
left untransformed.   
                                                 
5 In Grossman’s ‘pure consumption’ model, a rise in the wage rate would result in a reduction in the demand for health if health 
were more time-intensive than household production generally.    In his ‘pure investment’ model, the effect of a wage increase 
would be to raise the demand for health, unless time is the only input in the gross health investment production function, in which 
case a wage increase would leave the demand for health unaffected.     8
Table 4: Effects of changes in BMI-based mortality risk on changes in income 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 






Change in average BMI-based mortality risk among 







Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include all covariates listed in Table 2 and commune fixed effects, 
which were jointly significant. 
Table 5 reports the estimates of eqn (2) which adds health insurance, the poverty dummy 
and their interactions with BMI changes.  The interactions are insignificant—there appears to be 
no significant differences between the poor and non-poor or between the insured and uninsured 
in the effects of BMI changes on changes in either unearned and earned income.   
Table 5: Differential effects of BMI changes on income by insurance status and income group  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 












Change in average BMI among household 































Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include all covariates listed in Table 2 and commune fixed effects, 
which were jointly significant.   
BMI changes and changes in medical spending  
Beyond their impact on income, adverse health shocks are likely to necessitate increases     
in medical spending.  Column 1 of Table 6 shows that adverse health events are associated with 
increases in medical spending.  The size of the coefficient is similar in absolute terms to the size 
of the income coefficient.  This contrasts with the results for Indonesia presented in Gertler and 
Gruber, where the income effect was much larger in absolute size than the medical spending 
effect.  This may well reflect the different settings.  In Vietnam, 80% of health spending is paid 
out of pocket, compared to 47% in Indonesia (World_Health_Organization 2000; World_Bank, 
SIDA et al. 2001).  Furthermore, in the present sample in 1997, medical outlays accounted for 
6% of non-medical consumption, which is substantially larger than the 1% figure reported by 
Gertler and Gruber.     9
Table 6: Effects of BMI changes on medical consumption, by insurance status and income  
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Change in average BMI among household members 















Poor 1992/93      0.103 
(1.93) 
BMI x Poor 1992/93      -1.182 
(1.62) 
Estimates of BMI effects by insurance and income group      
Poor uninsured      -1.882 
(-3.14) 
Poor insured      -1.047 
(-1.20) 
Non-poor uninsured      -0.700 
(1.36) 
Non-poor insured      0.135 
(0.19) 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include all covariates listed in Table 2 and commune fixed 
effects, which were jointly significant.   
The results in column 1 of Table 6 are for the full sample.  Columns 2 and 3 suggest 
some heterogeneity in impacts, although the coefficients on the interaction terms are not 
significant at conventional levels.  The estimated coefficients by subgroup indicate that the 
largest increase in medical spending following an adverse BMI shock is among the poor 
uninsured, the only group for which the impact is significant.  The fact that the insured face no 
increase in medical outlays following an adverse health event is consistent with the generous 
coverage of the VHI program during the time period under consideration.   
BMI changes and changes in food and non-food consumption 
Negative BMI shocks thus appear to be associated with reductions in household income 
and increases in medical spending, at least among poor uninsured households.  The question 
arises: Can households hold their food and non-food consumption constant in the face of these 
changes?     10
Table 7: Effects of BMI changes on food and non-food consumption  
 
  Food consumption  Non-food consumption 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 























































R-squared           
           




         
Poor uninsured        0.085 
(0.56) 
    0.088 
(0.38) 
Poor insured        0.249 
(1.10) 




     0.169 
(1.27) 
    0.533 
(2.64) 
Non-poor insured        0.333 
(1.83) 
    0.805 
(2.91) 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include all covariates listed in Table 2 and commune fixed effects, which were jointly significant.   
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Columns 1 and 4 of Table 7 suggest that for the sample as a whole households are unable 
to smooth either food consumption or non-food consumption in the face of BMI shocks.  Of the 
two, they are more successful at smoothing food consumption.  There is some evidence here, 
then, for the claim that adverse health shocks in the developing world compromise people’s 
ability to maintain adequate consumption levels, including consumption of foodstuffs.   
Columns 2 and 5 suggest that, if anything, health insurance worsens households’ ability 
to smooth non-medical consumption in the face of BMI shocks, although the coefficients are not 
significant.  The fact that health insurance does nothing to increase households’ ability to smooth 
non-medical consumption in the face of health shocks presumably reflects the fact that while 
health insurance takes care of any medical outlays following a BMI shock, it does nothing to 
tackle the income losses, which as was seen earlier are appreciable.  The hint—and it is only a 
hint given the size of the relevant t-statistic—that health insurance may worsen households’ 
ability to smooth consumption would be consistent with a story that relatives and friends are 
more likely to look favorably on a request for a loan following a health shock if the household 
does not have health insurance.  They may take the view—wrongly, it seems, given the results 
presented here—that an insured household ought to be able to cope financially in the face of a 
health shock.   
Columns 3 and 4 and 7 and 8 of Table 7 contain something of a surprise, namely that if 
anything, the poor are better protected than the non-poor from BMI shocks.  The difference 
between the poor and non-poor is significant in the case of non-food consumption, though not in 
the case of food consumption.  The implied coefficients from the model with both sets of 
interactions (columns 4 and 8) indicate that among poor households—whether insured or not—
there is no impact of BMI shocks on either food consumption or non-food consumption.  By 
contrast, among the better-off households, there is a significant effect of BMI shocks on both 
food and non-food consumption.  This is counterintuitive, given that there are apparently no 
differences between the poor and better off in the income effects of BMI changes, and that the 
significant effects of BMI changes on medical spending noted earlier were specifically for the 
poor.  The implication is that the poor are borrowing or dissaving to hold food and non-food 
consumption constant in the face of increased medical spending, presumably considerably so.  
The puzzle is why they rely exclusively on borrowing and dissaving and do not instead change 
their food and non-food consumption as the better off do.  Possible explanations might include 
greater access by the poor to informal credit (not implausible but not especially likely either), or 
the existence of a threshold effect whereby poor households have levels of food and non-food 
consumption that are simply too low relative to basic needs to enable them to cut back in the face 
of an adverse BMI shock.   
IV. REDUCED-FORM RESULTS  
This section reports results of the alternative approach to assessing the impacts of health 
shocks through an analysis of the correlations of the residuals of the reduced-form equations in 
eqn (3).  Table 8 reports the coefficients of the reduced-form regressions for the full-sample and 
Table 9 the corresponding residual correlation matrix.  The system of reduced-form  regressions 
was then re-estimated for two sub-samples: the poorest 40% without health insurance, and the 
richest 60% with health insurance.     12
Table 9 tells much the same story as Tables 2, 6 and 7.  Unexplained changes in BMI are 
positively and significantly associated with (unexplained) changes in earned income, 
unexplained changes in BMI are not significantly associated with (unexplained) changes in 
unearned income.  (At the 15% level the latter association is significant and is negative—which 
echoes the finding vis-à-vis unearned income in Table 2.)  BMI shocks are significantly and 
negatively associated with (unexplained) changes in medical spending, significantly and 
positively associated with (unexplained) changes in non-food consumption, but not significantly 
associated with (unexplained) changes in food consumption.    
The residual correlations in Tables 10 and 11 are also consistent with the earlier results.  
For the poorest 40% without insurance, BMI shocks are significantly and negatively associated 
with (unexplained) changes in medical spending, but the residuals of the BMI and medical 
spending equations are not significantly correlated among the richest 60% of households with 
health insurance.  Among the poorest 40% without health insurance, BMI shocks are not 
significantly associated with (unexplained) changes in either food or non-food consumption, 
while the residuals between the BMI equation and the non-food consumption equation are 
significantly correlated in the case of the richest 60% with health insurance.   
The correlations between the residuals of the BMI reduced-form equation and the 
residuals of the other equations thus tell a similar story to the story that emerged from the 
previous section.  The other correlations in Tables 9-11 also convey information about the 
impact of income shocks on medical and non-medical consumption.  Income shocks—whether in 
earned or unearned income—are significantly and positively associated with (unexplained) 
changes in both food and non-food consumption, suggesting incomplete smoothing of 
consumption in the face of income shocks.  The residual correlations also point to income shocks 
leading to changes in medical consumption.     13
 
Table 8: Reduced-form growth equations for BMI, income, medical spending and non-medical consumption—full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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R-squared 0.1682  0.1132  0.1203  0.3065  0.2607  0.1528 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.  Regressions include commune fixed effects, which were jointly significant.   
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Table 9: Correlation matrix of residuals from reduced-form growth equations—full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 




Change in medical 
spending 
Change in food 
consumption 
Change in nonfood 
consumption 
Change in BMI 
        
Change in earned income  1.000           
        
        
Change in unearned income  -0.024  1.000         
  0.174       
        
Change in medical spending  -0.029  0.054  1.000       
  0.073  0.002      
        
Change in food consumption  0.201  0.116  0.045  1.000     
  0.000 0.000 0.004       
        
Change in nonfood 
consumption  0.135 0.147 0.063 0.337 1.000   
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
        
Change in BMI  0.064  -0.025  -0.043  0.029  0.047  1.000 
  0.000 0.154 0.007 0.062 0.002   
Note: Prob values below correlations  
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Table 10: Correlation matrix of residuals from reduced-form growth equations—poorest 40% of households without health insurance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 




Change in medical 
spending 
Change in food 
consumption 
Change in nonfood 
consumption 
Change in BMI 
        
Change in earned income  1.000           
        
        
Change in unearned income  -0.064  1.000         
  0.049       
        
Change in medical spending  -0.030  0.024  1.000       
 0.302  0.449         
        
Change in food 
consumption  0.161 0.121 0.065 1.000     
 0.000  0.000  0.018       
        
Change in nonfood 
consumption  0.045 0.090 0.069 0.361 1.000   
  0.109 0.004 0.012 0.000     
        
Change in BMI  0.065  -0.033  -0.067  0.002  -0.011  1.000 
  0.020 0.292 0.015 0.933 0.671   
Note: Prob values below correlations  
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Table 11: Correlation matrix of residuals from reduced-form growth equations—richest 60% of households with health insurance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 




Change in medical 
spending 
Change in food 
consumption 
Change in nonfood 
consumption 
Change in BMI 
        
Change in earned income  1.000           
        
        
Change in unearned income  -0.074  1.000         
  0.050       
        
Change in medical spending  -0.019  0.187  1.000       
  0.592  0.000      
        
Change in food consumption  0.261  0.022  -0.001  1.000     
  0.000 0.557 0.989       
        
Change in nonfood 
consumption  0.216 0.155 0.033 0.310 1.000   
  0.000 0.000 0.347 0.000     
        
Change in BMI  0.117  -0.015  -0.009  0.050  0.088  1.000 
  0.001 0.684 0.806 0.152 0.011   
Note: Prob values below correlations  
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
While there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence on the economic impacts of adverse 
health shocks, there is relatively little hard empirical evidence.  This paper builds on recent 
empirical work to explore in the context of post-reform Vietnam two related issues: how far 
household income and medical care spending respond to health shocks; and how far household 
consumption is protected against health shocks.   
The results suggest that adverse health shocks—captured by negative changes in body 
mass index (BMI)—are associated with reductions in earned income.  This appears to be only 
partly—if at all—due to a reverse feedback from income changes to BMI changes.  By contrast, 
there is a hint—the relevant coefficient is not significant—that adverse BMI shocks may result in 
increases in unearned income.  This may reflect additional gifts, remittances, etc. from family 
and friends following the health shock.  Medical spending is found to increase following an 
adverse health shock, but not among those with health insurance.  The impact for the uninsured 
is large, equal in absolute size to the income loss associated with a BMI shock.  This contrasts 
with previous work on Indonesia and reflects the heavy emphasis in Vietnam on out-of-pocket 
expenditures, which accounted for 80% of total health spending in 1998.  The lack of impact for 
the insured points to complete insurance against the medical care costs associated with health 
shocks, and is consistent with the very generous coverage of Vietnam’s health insurance program 
in this period.   
Adverse health shocks appear, then, to cause reductions in total household income and 
increases in medical spending, at least among the uninsured.  The issue arises: have Vietnamese 
households been able to hold their food and non-food consumption constant in the face of these 
income reductions and extra medical care outlays?  The results suggest not.  For the sample as a 
whole, both food and non-food consumption are found to be responsive to health shocks, 
indicating an inability to smooth non-medical consumption in the face of health shocks.   
Reassuringly and not altogether surprisingly, food consumption comes closer to being smoothed 
than non-food consumption.  Further analysis reveals some interesting differences across 
different groups within the sample.  Households with insurance come no closer to smoothing 
non-medical consumption than uninsured households; indeed, there is a hint—the coefficient is 
not significant—that they do worse.  The fact they do no better reflects the focus of health 
insurance on the medical expenses associated with health shocks to the complete exclusion of the 
income losses.  Finally, and somewhat counterintuitively, better-off households—including 
insured households—fare worse  than poorer households in smoothing their non-medical 
consumption in the face of health shocks, despite the fact that in the case of insured households 
there are no medical bills associated with an adverse health event.  Why the poor rely on 
dissaving and borrowing to such an extent, and do not apparently reduce their food and non-food 
consumption following an adverse health shock as the better off do, is a puzzle.  One possibility 
is the existence of a threshold effect whereby poor households have levels of food and non-food 
consumption that are simply too low relative to basic needs to enable them to cut back in the face 
of an adverse BMI shock.   
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